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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to revisit the key Basel II formula (BCBS, 2006) that is based on the seminal paper of Vasicek (1987) . The stability of the global financial system depends on a good performance of this particular formula, which has been put into question in the context of the global financial crisis.
The recently approved Basel III (BCBS, 2010) regulatory package tries to learn from the crisis. It aims to improve quality of the regulatory capital, to deal with the pro-cyclicality issue, to extend the risk coverage in the area trading book products, to set global liquidity standards, etc. However, it does not change at all the key formula which is used to calculate the unexpected losses, i.e. the required capital. Our analysis shows that the formula does not have to cover extreme losses sufficiently well and a stronger capital base could be achieved by its simple modification that is in fact consistent with bank credit risk modeling standards.
The capital requirement of a bank in the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach is calculated as the unexpected loss (UL) less the expected loss (EL) ( )
C UL EL UDR PD LGD EAD
decomposed into the unexpected default rate (UDR), probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and the exposure at default (EAD) on the level of each individual exposure. The portfolio invariant capital requirements (see Gordy, 2003) are summed up across the bank's portfolio. The probability of default parameter is an output of the internal rating model. The loss given default and exposure at default parameters are set by the regulator in the Foundation (IRBF) approach, or estimated by an internal model of the bank in the Advanced (IRBA) approach. Our main focus is the unexpected default rate (UDR) that is calculated as a regulatory function of PD, asset correlation ρ (set by the regulation depending on the asset class and PD), and the probability level α (set at 0.999): 
The formula, in detail explained in Section 2, is based on the assumption that the event of default is driven by a normally distributed variable. Moreover, the account level risk driving factor i Y is decomposed into a single normally distributed systematic factor and an independent normally distributed idiosyncratic factor
Since the idiosyncratic factors diversify away in a large and sufficiently granular portfolio, the unexpected losses are driven only by the systematic factor (Gordy, 2003) . The choice of the normal distribution is certainly natural. In addition, its technical advantage is that the sum of two independent normal variables in (3) is again normally distributed. The model in fact means that the correlation between defaults of different receivables is captured by a Gaussian copula (see e.g. Cherubini et al, 2004 ).
On the other hand, the banking industry standard approach to internal ratings uses the technique of logistic regression based on the assumption that the event of default is driven by a logistically distributed variable. The logistic (or logit) regression can be compared to the probit binary choice regression where the events are driven by a normal variable. It is, however, recognized that in case of probability of default modeling the logistic regression performs better, in terms of estimation results and in particular because of fatter tails of the logistic distribution. It is surprising that, according to our knowledge, an analogy of the Vasicek formula has not been considered and compared to the normal distribution based formula (2) . We argue that it is possible to replace simply the cumulative distribution function ( ) x Φ in (2) by the logistic function The only technical complication is that the weighted sum of two independent logistically distributed variables is not exactly logistically distributed, but we will show that the empirical difference is negligible. The choice of the logistic distribution means that the correlation of defaults is captured in a way that should perform better in extreme situations. It is not just another, single systematic factor copula model, but in our view the most natural model consistent with the industry standard of probability of default modeling.
In order to compare performance of the two formulas one could simply compare the outputs of (2) with the normal and logistic distributions for different segments and PD values given the regulatory correlation and probability level. However, the correlation has been presumably calibrated with respect to the normal distribution and in order to compare meaningfully the two formulas we should recalibrate the correlation for the logistic distribution model in a way similar to the regulatory approach. Unfortunately, there is no public document that would disclose exactly the calculations underlying the regulatory asset correlation values. BCBS (2005) only indicates that the correlations have been chosen in order to fit historical default rate series. Nagpal, Bahar (2001) have used a non-parametric approach suggested by Lucas (1995) to estimate the correlation of US corporate defaults. Calem and Follain (2003) in a Federal Reserve System study on the asset correlation for the class of single-family mortgages propose to apply advanced portfolio unexpected loss models and "reverse-engineer" the asset correlation in (2 By definition, default happens, if and only if Y b ≤ . Since Y and b can be rescaled, we may assume without loss of generality that the mean of Y is 0 and that its variance is 1 (or another given constant). Moreover, we will assume that Y has a particular known distribution. For example, if Y has the standard normal distribution, and if we know that the probability of default is PD,
, and so
The classical Vasicek's model works with the normal distribution. Its goal is to find the distribution of future default rates (e.g. at 1 t = ) on a large (theoretically infinite) portfolio of receivables where the events of default might be partially correlated. ζ are independent and diversify away in a large (asymptotic) portfolio, the future default rate depends only on the systematic factor V:
As the default rate increases with decreasing V, we can determine its quantiles simply plugging in the corresponding quantiles of V. The critical default rate that can be realized on a probability level 1 α − , e.g. for 0.999
, is simply given by
The probability of default PD is one of the key inputs of the Vasicek's formula. In a standard banking credit rating model it is based on a credit scoring (regression) function that uses a vector of known explanatory variables x . The scoring model can be formulated in the same framework as the Vasicek's model: the event of default (at 1 t = ) is modeled by a latent variable i Y that is decomposed into a known (or explained part) and an unknown part (reflecting an error and a future change of the credit quality variable), '
In this case, we can assume without loss of generality that 0 b = since the default threshold can be incorporated into the constant term of ' i β x . Consequently the probability of default is: 
If F = Φ is the normal cdf, then the model is known as the probit binary-response model (Greene, 2003) . However, in case of credit scoring, researchers as well as practitioners prefer the logit model where F = Λ is the logistic distribution. The model is considered to be more efficient, better analytically tractable, and compatible with the useful concepts of log-odds score and the Weight of Evidence (see e.g. Witzany, 2010).
The standard logistic distribution is defined by the cumulative distribution function π . Note that the inverse of the logistic function assigning quantiles to given probabilities is the logit function:
The general logistic distribution with mean µ and variance If the first two moments of a normal distribution, logistic distribution, and a t-distribution are matched, then it is easy to verify that the logistic and normal distributions diverge for quantiles beyond two standard deviations from the mean, with the t-distribution being much closer to the logistic one. Therefore, the logistic distribution has heavier tails and is more robust to inaccuracies in the underlying model or to errors in the data. 
which unfortunately does not yield the logistic function again. However, Figure 1 indicates that the differences are almost negligible. Table 1 lists 95%, 99%, and 99.9% quantiles of the normal, logistic, and mixed logistic distributions (6) for several sample correlations. The differences between the logistic and mixed logistic distributions are more significant only for 99.9% α = and for higher correlation values, yet still not large when compared to the difference between the normal and logistic distributions. ρ ∈ a constant. Consequently, i Y has the "almost-logistic" distribution given by (6) . Repeating the argument (4) we obtain the following formula for the default rate on the probability level α :
, we propose to use the formula
as an alternative to the Vasicek's formula (2). We will call the formula "logistic Vasicek".
We have argued that the logistic Vasicek formula is compatible with the logistic regression widely used to estimate and model probabilities of defaults. In order to compare the impact of the two formulas we can as a first approximation use the regulatory correlations and calculate the differences. Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows that the relative differences are more than 20% for PD values in the range from 3% to 25%. However, such a comparison is not really consistent since the regulatory correlations have been calibrated so that the model (2) fits a representative dataset. Unfortunately, the regulator (i.e. BCBS -the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision) does not disclose the exact method or the dataset used for the calibration. BCBS (2005) only indicates that the correlation is chosen so that it fits the variability of a historical series of default rates.
Let us consider a series of historical default rates 1 ,..., n p p observed over one-year, or possibly quarter of a year, or even over shorter time-horizons. Assume, that the default rate realizations are given by the model respectively. In order to fit this simple model we just need to estimate the correlation ρ maximizing the likelihood function (or rather its logarithm) ( ) 1 ( ; , wh e re ( ; , ( ; ) ) )
) 
is decomposed into a known predictable part, a latent systematic factor, and an idiosyncratic factor. The probability of default conditional on , 1
i t−
x and conditional on a realization of the systematic factor then is
Hamerle et al. ( )
According to Hamerle, Rosch (2006) the integral can be approximated by a Gaussian quadrature and the likelihood needs to be maximized numerically. The confidence intervals need to be estimates using the Fisher information matrix that is evaluated numerically.
Empirical Study
In order to compare the potential impact of the normal and logistic Vasicek's formulas we use the data provided by the U.S. Federal Reserve Figure 4 shows the volatile development of the overall delinquency rate.
Although the notion of delinquency is not fully compatible with the Basel concept of default (ninety or more days past due) we will use the seasonally adjusted delinquency rate in order to indicatively compare the two alternative Vasicek's formulas. Since Basel II is based on segmentation we estimate the correlation parameters separately for a few most important segments, namely: residential mortgages, credit cards, consumer loans, and corporate loans. Because we do not have transaction level data, we implement just the simple estimation method outlined in Section 2. Table 3 shows the estimation results. For each of the four segments we have estimated the correlation maximizing (8) with F = Φ or F = Λ (normal and logistic). The estimation error is given by the inversion of the second derivative of the log-likelihood function at the estimated correlation parameter. The two models can be compared, for example, by using the ordinary likelihood ratio
The ratio shows a significantly better fit of the logistic model in case of the most important mortgage loans segment. The normal distribution model performs better for the corporate segments, and the results are mixed for credit cards and consumer loans. The estimated correlation of the logistic model is higher than the one of the normal model in case of all the segments. While the correlations for the mortgage and corporate segments are at expected levels, the credit cards and consumer loans correlations are unusually low and would be probably replaced by a minimum threshold. The differences between the unexpected default rate increments (UDR PD − ) for the two models are even higher due to the effect indicated by Figure 2 . Since the unexpected default rate increment UDR PD − is a multiplicative factor of the Basel II formula (1) we may conclude that the capital requirement would be almost doubled for the mortgage and corporate segments if the normal Vasicek formula was replaced by the logistic one. The exposure weighted difference between the normal Vasicek and logistic Vasicek formula capital requirement turns out to be 93.4%.
Conclusion
We have argued that the Vasicek's formula presenting a quantitative core of the Basel II regulation should be based rather on the logistic than on the normal distribution in line with standard logistic regression PD estimation approach. Based on an empirical analysis, the standard normal cumulative distribution function in the Vasicek's formula can be simply replaced by the logistic function. If the correlation parameters were kept on the current regulatory level the capital requirement could be 20-30% higher compared to the current formula results. Nevertheless, if the correlation parameters were re-estimated for the logistic distribution model capturing better extreme events (like the recent financial crisis) than, according to our empirical study, the differences are even more dramatic reaching 90-100%.
The result shows a significant model risk of the current Basel II regulation. The proposed logistic Vasicek's formula is not just a formula based on a special distribution or a copula function. In our view, it is the most natural choice related choice in the context of current PD modeling standards. The differences indicate that the global banking system might be seriously undercapitalized and vulnerable in times of a financial crisis.
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